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10 
Night Fight 
Clare	Mac	Cumhaill	
When	the	Romanian	existentialist	writer	E.	M.	Cioran	died	in	1995,	it	was	reputed	that	he	had	not	slept	for	more	than	half	a	century.	A	‘career	insomniac’,	Cioran	claimed	to	have	stopped	sleeping	at	the	age	of	seventeen,	after	which	time,	by	his	own	account,	everything	he	wrote	–	all	his	‘divagations’	–	issued	from	his	insomnia.	Regier	remarks	that	the	poet	wore	his	pyjamas	‘like	a	hairshirt’	(2004:	994),	insomnia	a	kind	of	blissful	martyrdom	which,	despite	the	‘heights	of	despair’	that	his	sleeplessness	induced,	brought	its	own	‘blessings’:	Just	as	ecstasy	purifies	you	of	the	particular	and	the	contingent,	leaving	nothing	except	light	and	darkness,	so	insomnia	kills	off	the	multiplicity	and	diversity	of	the	world,	leaving	you	prey	to	your	private	obsessions.	What	strangely	enchanted	tunes	gush	forth	during	those	sleepless	nights!	Their	flowing	tones	are	bewitching,	but	there	is	a	note	of	regret	in	this	melodic	surge	which	keeps	it	short	of	ecstasy.	What	kind	of	regret?	It	is	hard	to	say,	because	insomnia	is	so	complex	that	one	cannot	tell	what	the	loss	is.	(Cioran	1992:	83)	In	this	chapter1	I	explore	to	what	extent,	and	along	what	dimensions,	a	link	between	regret,	wakefulness,	and	insomnia	can	be	excavated	–	and,	as	I	will	show,	Cioran’s	lyric	
                                                            1	Some	of	the	ideas	in	this	chapter	arose	out	of	discussion	with	Edoardo	Zamuner	and	owe	much	to	him.	I	am	grateful	too	to	the	thumos	research	group,	Geneva,	from	whose	activities	and	support	I	have	greatly	benefitted.	Work	for	this	chapter	was	
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phenomenology	speaks	somewhat	obliquely	to	this	connection.	But	in	doing	so,	I	also	aim	to	explicitly	echo	something	of	Cioran’s	difficulty	in	finding	it	‘hard	to	say’	just	what	the	peculiar	loss	of	regret	is,	or,	cast	differently,	what	its	proper	object	is.	It	is	striking	that	the	philosophical	literature	on	regret	should	be	likewise	undecided,	variously	offering,	among	other	things,	states	of	affairs	(Williams	1976),	blunders	(Jacobson	2013),	valuable	unchosen	alternatives	supported	by	reasons	(Bagnoli	2000),	and	objects	of	attachment,	including	one’s	own	life	(Wallace	2014).	My	dialectical	strategy	will	be	to	try	to	show	that	such	multiplicity	can	be	read	as	speaking	not	just,	or	even	primarily,	to	the	potential	variety	of	the	objects	of	regret,	but	also	to	aspects	of	its	ontology.	In	particular,	my	exploration	will	attempt	to	uncover	regret’s	relationship	to	time	through	consideration	of	the	nature	of	the	wakeful	state.	Further,	it	will	consider	the	extent	to	which	the	mental	activities	of	thinking	and	imagining	which	intuitively	accompany	regret	are	partly	constitutive	of	it.	I	will	argue	that	such	activities	may	sometimes	be	helpfully	understood	as	mental	expressive	actions	–	a	category	of	expressive	action	so	far	neglected	in	the	literature.	A	leading	thread	of	my	argument	is	to	suggest	that	regret	is	an	affective	state	of	the	wakeful.	The	puzzle	that	frames	my	‘divagation’	is	why	the	state	of	regret	is	not	merely	incompatible	with	sleep	but	precludes	falling	asleep	–	that	is	why	regret	may	occasionally	be,	to	coin	a	word,	insomniacal.	My	conclusion	is	that	those	episodes	of	regretting	that	are	insomniacal	have	a	peculiarly	self-reflexive	character	that	reflection	
                                                            started	while	a	post-doc	on	the	Swiss	National	Science	Foundation	project	‘The	Intentionality	the	Mark	of	the	Mental’.	I	also	thank	participants	of	the	‘Dream,	Sleep,	Emotion’	workshop	which	I	organised	in	September	2013	in	Geneva,	and	Ralph	Schmidt,	whose	work	on	the	affective	dimensions	of	insomnia	prompted	this	exploration.	I	thank	Hichem	Naar	and	Fabrice	Teroni	for	their	thoughtful	comments	on	a	first	draft.	
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on	the	ontological	character	of	occurrent	regret	helps	make	articulate:	they	bear	a	certain	relation	to	the	subject	who	is	in	that	occurrent	state.2	To	this	extent,	disputes	over	the	proper	object	of	regret,	insofar	as	I	engage	with	them,	act	only	as	a	prism	through	which	my	primary	concern	can	be	brought	into	view	–	the	link	between	regret,	wakefulness,	and,	ultimately,	insomnia.	That	regret	may	be	variously	theorised	as	having	very	different	proper	objects	is,	I	explain,	symptomatic	of	the	fact	that	the	state	of	wakeful	consciousness	is	itself	complex,	a	complexity	that	reflection	on	the	nature	of	regret	reveals	and,	I	suggest,	replicates.	The	analysis	I	offer	hinges	fairly	uncritically	on	the	insight	of	Brian	O’Shaughnessy,	and	in	particular	his	‘Anatomy	of	Consciousness’	in	Consciousness	and	the	World,	which	I	detail	in	§§1–2.3	For	the	most	part,	it	cleaves	closely	to	O’Shaughnessy’s	analysis,	applying	it	to	the	case	of	regret.	In	this	sense,	this	chapter	is	synthetic	and	expository,	though	along	the	way	some	novel	claims	are	drawn,	specifically	regarding	the	link	between	regret	and	mental	activity.	We	can	get	an	early	glimpse	at	this	connection	by	noting	what	Janet	Landman	in	her	expansive	Regret	calls	the	‘occasions	of	regret’.	Landman	notes	a	link	between	the	availability	of	time	for	thoughtful	reflection	and	regret.	Reflectiveness,	she	says,	is	typically	enhanced	when	alone	and	unencumbered	by	daily	tasks	and	hence	‘by	far	the	single	most	frequently	reported	time	
                                                            2	For	discussion	of	the	ontological	category	of	occurrent	state,	see	Soteriou	(2013).	3	Some	aspects	of	O’Shaughnessy’s	proposal	require	further	defence	or	are	questionable.	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	the	idea	is	only	to	set	out	the	general	explanatory	framework.	See	also	Matthew	Soteriou’s	chapter	in	this	volume	(Chapter	4).	In	various	respects,	I	am	also	indebted	to	a	reading	of	Soteriou	(2013).	
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for	regret	[is]	evening	or	night-time’	(1993:	204).4	Likewise,	Schmidt	and	Van	der	Linden	observe	that	‘bedtime	may	often	be	the	first	quiet	period	in	the	course	of	the	day	available	to	review	one’s	own	behaviour’	(2013:	873)	and	that	‘this	time	window	might	be	particularly	suitable	for	the	emergence	of	feelings	of	regret,	shame	and	guilt’	(873).	But	if	regret	typically	emerges	at	the	‘first	quiet	period’	of	the	day,	the	link	between	bedtime	and	regretting	is	no	surprise	–	it	is	a	mere	correlation.	That	regret	may	preclude	sleep	–	as	Schmidt	and	his	collaborator	also	seek	to	establish	–	is	more	mysterious.5	Why	should	regret	induce	insomnia?	Like	other	writers,	Schmidt	and	Van	der	Linden	take	it	that	regret	is	a	counterfactual	emotion.	Zeelenberg	and	Pieters	gloss	this	as	follows:	Feeling	regret	requires	the	ability	to	imagine	other	possibilities	than	the	current	state	of	the	world.	One	has	to	reflect	on	one’s	choices	and	the	outcomes	generated	by	these	choices,	but	one	also	has	to	reflect	on	what	other	outcomes	might	have	been	obtained	by	making	a	different	choice.	Put	differently,	regret	is	a	counterfactual	emotion.	(2007:	5)	Regret,	then,	involves	mental	activity.	But	in	what	sense	is	this	mental	activity	affective?	The	authors	do	not	say.	They	do,	however,	make	a	suggestive	remark	in	passing:	regret	‘both	stems	from,	and	produces,	higher	order	cognitive	processes’	(5).	Part	of	my	exploration	will	be	to	consider	just	how	the	higher-order	processes	of	actively	thinking	and	imagining	may	be	involved	in	regretting	in	this	dual	sense.	As	I	explain,	however,	
                                                            4	Jacobson	implicitly	notes	a	connection	between	regret	and	nocturnal	wakefulness.	In	discussing	an	individual	for	whom	feelings	of	regret	would	not	be	appropriate,	he	notes:	‘If	any	unwanted	feeling	keeps	her	up	at	night,	it	is	more	likely	anxiety’	(2013:	101).	5	Schmidt	and	Van	der	Linden	(2011)	provide	empirical	evidence	showing	a	correlation	between	self-reported	regret	and	insomnia.	
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while	certain	patterns	of	thought	and	imagining	may	well	produce	feelings	of	regret,	and	while	regret	may	in	turn	precipitate	further	thoughts	and	imaginings,	there	is	also	reason	to	think	that	at	least	some	thoughts	and	imaginings	may	be	constitutively	regretful	in	the	sense	that	they	may	be	understood	not	as	productive	of,	nor	as	produced	by	regret,	but	rather	as	expressions	of	regret.	The	chapter	unfolds	as	follows:	in	§1,	I	sketch	Brian	O’Shaughnessy	analysis	of	wakeful	consciousness	(readers	familiar	with	O’Shaughnessy’s	work	can	skip	this	section).	I	explain	that	although	on	certain	accounts	of	regret	the	proper	object	of	the	emotion	lies	in	the	past,	the	kind	of	temporal	orientation	that	wakefulness	enables	cannot	yet	explain	the	link	between	regret,	wakefulness,	and,	specifically,	insomnia	(§2).	I	then	focus	on	the	question	framed	earlier:	assuming	that	regret	involves	mental	activity,	in	what	sense	is	that	mental	activity	affective?	In	this	part	of	my	discussion,	I	draw	on	the	illuminating	work	of	Carla	Bagnoli,	and	more	narrowly	on	her	divergence	from	Bernard	Williams	concerning	the	proper	object	of	regret.	I	pick	up	her	disagreement	with	Williams	to	motivate	the	claim	that	sometimes	the	mental	activity	that	occurs	in	regret	can	be	understood	as	expressive,	in	turn	bringing	work	by	Peter	Goldie	to	bear	on	a	number	of	suggestive	comments	that	Williams	makes	when	elucidating	his	celebrated	conception	of	agent-regret	in	‘Moral	Luck’	(§§3–4).	In	particular,	I	bring	two	features	of	Williams’	characterisation	of	so-called	agent-regret	(in	a	sense	to	be	made	plain)	into	synchrony:	the	idea	that	agent-regret	involves	a	particular	mode	of	expression.	And	the	thought	that	regret	involves	a	wish.	Linking	these,	I	will	suggest	that	the	mental	activity	that	attends	and	as	I	claim	partly	constitutes	regret	is	in	fact	expressive	of	a	wish:	namely	the	wish	that	things	were	otherwise	was	satisfied	now.	
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In	closing,	I	return	to	the	puzzle	that	Cioran’s	despair	makes	striking:	the	puzzle	as	to	why	occurrent	regret	is	not	merely	incompatible	with	sleep,	but	may	preclude	falling	asleep.	I	offer	a	tentative	response	in	closing,	focusing	on	the	self-conscious	character	of	occurrent	regret	(§5).	
1 O’Shaughnessy on the State of Wakeful 
Consciousness 
For	O’Shaughnessy,	consciousness	is	‘that	vastly	familiar	light	that	appears	in	the	head	when	a	person	surfaces	from	sleep	or	anaesthesia	or	dream.	In	other	words	with	the	state	we	call	“waking”’	(2000:	68).	The	‘problem	of	consciousness’,	as	he	understands	it,	is	not,	then,	what	theorists	have	elsewhere	referred	to	as	the	‘hard	problem’	of	consciousness	–	after	all,	the	hard	problem	arises	as	much	for	sensory	experience	in	dream	as	it	does	for	wakeful	experience.	Rather	the	problem	O’Shaughnessy	addresses	is	what	the	correct	analysis	of	wakeful	consciousness	is,	where	he	takes	it	that	wakeful	consciousness	is	only	one	among	a	variety	of	states	of	consciousness	of	which	the	wakeful	state	of	consciousness	is	the	‘parent	sub-variety’.6	I	spell	out	this	peculiar	taxonomic	terminology.	As	O’Shaughnessy	explains,	every	living	animal	is	in	some	state	of	consciousness.	But,	accordingly,	consciousness	does	not	relate	to	unconsciousness	as	life	relates	to	death	–	
                                                            6	Somewhat	confusingly,	O’Shaughnessy	refers	to	wakeful	consciousness	as	consciousness.	For	clarity,	I	systematically	refer	to	wakeful	consciousness.	
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[w]hereas	the	paths	to	death	lead	to	the	monolithic	state	of	death,	the	paths	leading	away	from	consciousness	conduct	one	in	different	directions	towards	diverse	states.	(70)	–	specifically,	they	lead	one	to	the	states	of	sleep	or	unconsciousness.	And	sometimes	wakeful	consciousness	itself	can	be	‘disordered’,	in	a	sense	to	be	made	plain.	In	sorting	among	these	states	of	consciousness	and	in	insisting	that	wakeful	consciousness	is	the	‘parent	sub-variety’,	O’Shaughnessy	makes	plain	his	methodology.	We	are	not,	he	says,	dealing	with	real	essences	or	natural	kinds.	Rather,	diverse	states	of	consciousness	can	be	individuated	a	priori:	Conceptually	we	begin	with	[properly	formed	wakeful]	consciousness	and	privatively	derive	the	others	by	denuding	it	of	powers.	The	state	of	waking	marshals	our	central	mental	powers	–	to	experience,	sense-perceive,	think,	and	reason	cogently	and	actively	manipulate	the	environment	with	a	view	to	fulfilling	our	needs	–	and	all	other	states	are	noteworthy	for	the	absence	of	some	or	even	all	of	the	above.	(70)	His	methodology,	then,	is	to	descriptively	analyse	diverse	states	of	consciousness	by	considering	what	such	‘denuded’	states	of	consciousness	fail	to	enable	in	their	owner.	For	example,	deepest	unconsciousness	involves	the	‘total	suspension’	(73)	of	psychological	events	–	the	subject	is	divested	of	the	powers	to	imagine,	sense-perceive,	and	reason	–	while	light	sleep	permits	dreaming.	Likewise,	drunkenness	may	inhibit	or,	occasionally,	enhance	certain	powers	(see	Crowther	forthcoming	a,	2016	for	discussion	–	curiously,	O’Shaughnessy	thinks	that	the	drunk	are	not	properly	awake).	An	important	power	that	O’Shaughnessy	discusses	involves	the	ability	to	apply	the	indexical	‘now’.	A	dreamless	sleeper	cannot	entertain	beliefs	about	the	present	
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instant	picked	out	as	‘now’:	‘[i]f	he	fell	asleep	at	6.00	a.m.,	and	awoke	at	6.10	a.m.,	he	cannot	at	6.05	a.m.	entertain	a	belief	about	the	instant	6.05	a.m.	singled	out	as	“now”’	(51).	But	since	a	non-experiencer	cannot	be	conscious	of	an	instant	singled	out	as	‘now’,	nor	can	such	a	subject	be	aware	of	a	succession	of	‘nows’	and,	hence,	of	the	passage	of	time.	I	revisit	the	import	of	time	shortly.7	For	now	let	us	remark	in	what	sense	wakeful	consciousness	is	the	‘parent	sub-variety’	of	all	other	states	of	consciousness.	It	is	the	parent	sub-variety	since	all	other	‘sub-varieties’	are	‘denuded’	insofar	as	they	involve	privations	of	the	powers	or	capacities	that	characterise	the	non-disordered	wakeful	state.	To	this	extent,	the	non-disordered	wakeful	state	is	a	perfection	associated	with	a	‘syndrome’	of	properties8	(74),	properties	that,	says	O’Shaughnessy,	‘travel	of	necessity	in	groups’	(74).9	For	instance,	when	fully	awake,	one	can	perceive,	think,	imagine,	make	plans,	and	so	on.	Other	sub-varieties	of	the	conscious	state	are	likewise	‘syndromes’	of	powers	or	properties,	but	they	are	lacking	insofar	as	they	are	‘denuded’	of	certain	powers	relative	to	the	parent	sub-variety:	wakefulness.	Wakefulness,	then,	is	a	state	that	is	associated	with	a	syndrome	of	powers.	Importantly,	however,	the	state	is	more	than	a	mere	assembly	or	constellation	of	such	powers	or	properties.	O’Shaughnessy	offers	various	considerations	in	support	of	this	supposition.	The	most	striking	provocation	offered	is	the	following:	in	removing	the	state	of	consciousness,	say,	by	using	an	anaesthetic,	one	removes	all	the	properties	or	
                                                            7	Interestingly,	experience	of	the	passage	of	time	is	less	pertinent	to	an	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	regretting	than	temporal	orientation	is.	Experience	of	passage	does,	however,	seem	to	be	central	to	the	phenomenology	of	insomnia,	but	I	leave	this	unexplored.	8	This	is	not	to	say	that	one	property	of	a	state	entails	the	other	–	some,	though	not	all	do.	Rather	properties	necessarily	occur	in	sets	that	realise	unique	states	of	consciousness	(75).	9	Note	that	properties	of	the	state	are	powers	of	the	subject	in	that	state.	
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powers.	But	to	this	extent,	the	properties	depend	on	the	state,	for	the	state	explains	their	presence.	However,	this	is	not	all.	As	O’Shaughnessy	also	insists,	modifying	the	properties	that	realise	the	state	also	involves	a	modification	of	the	state	thereby	realised.	For	example,	consider	the	effect	that	meditation	has	on	one’s	wakeful	experience.	Or	copious	amounts	of	wine.	Plainly,	the	character	of	one’s	conscious	state	is	modified.	But,	as	such,	even	while	the	state	explains	the	presence	of	the	realising	properties	on	which	it	depends	(remove	consciousness	and	you	remove	the	powers),	the	properties	that	realise	the	state	are	also	said	to	constitute	it	insofar	as	a	modification	of	the	powers	involves	a	modification	of	the	state.	This	holism	will	be	of	some	import	later.	Before	that	O’Shaughnessy’s	thinking	must	be	detailed	still	further.	Most,	if	not	all,	of	the	capacities	‘marshalled’	in	the	state	of	wakeful	consciousness	involve	what	philosophers	have	designated,	obscurely	in	my	view,	as	‘the	will’.	O’Shaughnessy	is	peculiar,	however,	in	distinguishing	two	forms	of	willing	–	mental	and	bodily.	The	use	of	the	will,	says	O’Shaughnessy,	is	constitutive	of	wakeful	consciousness,	though	critically	‘no	experience	utilising	the	bodily	will	is	essential	to	[wakeful]	consciousness’	(88;	my	emphasis)	–	after	all,	we	can	be	fully	conscious	‘though	supine	in	a	hammock’	(226).	But	this	suggests	an	essential	role	for	the	mental	will	in	constituting	wakeful	consciousness.	O’Shaughnessy	captures	this	with	a	necessity	claim:	‘The	mind	of	one	who	is	conscious	is	necessarily	a	mind	actively	governing	the	movement	of	its	own	attentive	and	thinking	processes’	(89).	Let	us	understand	by	‘mental	willing’	this	‘active	governing’.	As	might	be	supposed,	the	liminality	of	the	‘bed-time	window’	is	apt	to	throw	such	governance	into	disarray	–	at	least	when	the	subject	is	poised	to	surrender	her	will	to	sleep.	The	question	is	how	we	should	understand	the	relation	between	mental	
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activity	and	nocturnal	regret.	I	begin	to	spell	out	that	connection	in	§3.	First,	I	explore	two	other	features	of	wakeful	consciousness	–	self-consciousness	and	temporal	orientation	–	which,	as	I	argue,	may	be	relevant	to	our	exploration.	I	then	attempt	an	application	of	O’Shaughnessy’s	ontological	reflections	on	the	state	of	wakefulness	to	the	case	of	regret.	
2 Wakeful Consciousness: Self-Consciousness 
and Orientation in Time 
As	we	have	noted,	for	O’Shaughnessy,	wakeful	consciousness	enables	a	cluster	of	capacities	or	powers	in	the	subject,	including	the	abilities	to	sense-perceive	and	to	engage	in	wilful	action	with	one’s	surroundings.	However,	not	all	wakefully	conscious	creatures	are	self-conscious	–	for	O’Shaughnessy,	a	‘higher’,	‘more	developed	form’	of	consciousness	(102).	I	focus	here	on	only	one	feature	of	O’Shaughnessy’s	rich	analysis	of	self-consciousness:	the	property	of	self-awareness.	I	will	suggest	that	there	are	two	broad	respects	in	which	self-awareness	is	explanatorily	relevant	to	our	analysis.	First,	regret	involves	awareness	of	the	mode	of	one’s	cogitations	–	I	spell	this	out	shortly.	Second,	certain	forms	of	nocturnal	regretting,	specifically	those	that	are	insomniacal,	may	be	apt	to	have	the	‘self’	or	‘one’s	life’	or	‘occurrent	existence’	as	one	among	their	objects.	O’Shaughnessy	supposes	that	the	‘advent	of	self-awareness’	brought	with	it	a	new	realm	of	awareness	and	knowledge	–	awareness	of	‘the	entire	realm	of	the	mental’	(103).	Unlike	the	ways	in	which	the	outer,	non-mental	realm	comes	to	be	known,	however,	the	objects	of	the	‘inner’	realm	are	known	immediately.	‘Thus,	I	know	that	I	am	now	thinking	this,	I	know	I	now	believe	that,	I	know	that	I	do	so	because	I	now	
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observed	such	and	such’	(105).10	What	is	the	scope	of	such	immediate	self-knowledge?	For	one,	the	content	of	one’s	thoughts	and	experiences	are	immediately	known.	Critically,	one	also	knows	their	mode	–	that	is,	one	knows	that	one	is	imagining	rather	than	remembering,	conjecturing	rather	than	believing,	and	so	on.	O’Shaughnessy	draws	a	comparison	with	the	dreaming	subject	so	as	to	make	plain,	or	instruct,	in	what	sense	this	is	so.11	The	dreamer,	says	O’Shaughnessy,	takes	his	imaginings	to	be	seeings	and	is	hence	ignorant	of	their	ultimate	character	–	viz.	that	they	are	imaginings.	A	like	failure	is	said	to	occur	in	mental	illness	(see	also	O’Shaughnessy	1972).	A	mentally	ill	subject	may	take	her	wakeful	imaginings	to	be	real.	But,	as	such,	her	wakeful	consciousness	is	thereby	said	to	be	‘disordered’	or	ill-formed.	What	is	meant	by	this	normative	charge?	A	subject	that	is	self-aware	of	the	contents	of	her	mental	states	and	occurrences	is	a	subject	that	can	encounter	both	the	inner	and	outer	world	‘under	the	aspect	of	truth’	(111).	This	notion	is	spelt	out	using	the	idiom	of	‘comparison’:	(merely)	animal	consciousness,	while	it	relates	cognitively	to	the	world,	has	nothing	to	do	with	truth.	Or	perhaps	better	expressed:	animals	know	truths	but	not	their	truth.	A	dog	knowing	it	is	about	to	be	fed,	does	not	know	it	is	true	that	it	is	about	to	be	fed.	It	could	do	so	only	if	it	could	compare	the	thought	‘I	am	about	to	be	fed’	with	the	reality	that	makes	it	true	(for	truth	arises	out	of	the	matching	of	thought	and	reality).	And	this	in	turn	requires	the	knowledge	that	one	has	that	thought,	together	with	
                                                            10	Though	he	also	grants:	‘very	occasionally	we	discover	what	is	here	and	now	occurring	in	our	own	minds	through	inference	and	appeal	to	experience’	(105).	11	The	dreaming	subject	often	provides	an	important	contrast	case	for	O’Shaughnessy,	and	I	use	his	contrastive	expository	method	here.	
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the	capacity	to	contemplate	its	denial	as	a	possibility	that	is	here	in	fact	not	realised.	(111;	my	emphasis)	This	indicates	the	import	of	self-knowledge	of	the	inner	realm	to	the	possibility	of	encountering	the	world	under	the	aspect	of	truth.	Those	who	mistake	imaginings	for	reality	are	not	in	a	position	to	encounter	the	world	in	this	guise.	Accordingly,	the	consciousness	of	such	a	subject	is	‘disordered’.	I	return	to	this	supposition	in	§5.	In	what	remains	of	this	section,	another	feature	of	wakeful	consciousness	is	sketched:	temporal	orientation.	Again,	the	dreaming	subject	illuminates.		Dream,	as	O’Shaughnessy	vividly	notes,	is	a	‘Time	Island’.	The	dream	is	created	‘anew	in	each	instant’	(92),	‘in	experiential	mid-air’,	‘each	instant	[disengaging]	in	certain	significant	ways	from	its	predecessor	instants’	(91).	But	this	being	so,	he	insists,	the	dreamer	cannot	be	genuinely	cognitively	orientated	towards	the	dream	past	or	future.	It	might	be	asked	what	the	status	of	this	claim	is.	I	take	it	that	O’Shaughnessy	means	it	to	be	a	piece	of	descriptive	phenomenology.	I	hence	leave	to	one	side	any	kind	of	scepticism	about	the	reality	of	dreams.	My	goal	is	only	to	excavate	a	contrast	with	wakeful	experience	and	here	the	idea	is	that	wakeful	experience,	if	it	is	not	disordered,	does	not	have	this	character.	That	is	to	say,	in	wakeful	experience	each	instant	is	not	experienced	as	‘disengaging	in	significant	ways	from	its	predecessors’.	Further,	and	unlike	the	dreamer,	the	wakeful	subject	can	entertain	cognitive	attitudes	to	future	and	past	times,	including,	through	episodic	memory,	attitudes	to	particular	past	times.12	Such	observations	then	suggest	an	initial	way	in	which	wakefulness	and	regret	may	be	linked,	namely,	and	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	through	the	past.	For	if	what	is	regretted	
                                                            12	See	Campbell	(1994)	for	discussion	of	the	distinction	between	temporal	orientation	with	respect	to	phase	and	with	respect	to	particular	times.	
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are	past	events	or	states	of	affairs,	and	if	regretting	involves	entertaining	those	events	as	past,	a	dreaming	subject	is	not	in	the	cognitive	position	to	experience	regret.	It	does	not	know	the	mode	of	its	cogitations.	As	might	be	supposed,	there	are	different	ways	in	which	the	connection	between	regret	and	the	past	can	be	spelt	out.	Jacobson	(2013),	for	instance,	takes	it	that	what	is	regretted	are	bad	decisions	and	their	consequences.	On	this	view,	at	least	part	of	what	is	regretted	is	past	error	in	deliberation.	Bernard	Williams’	treatment	of	regret	also	makes	special	room	for	the	past,	albeit	in	a	distinct	way.	For	Williams,	what	are	regretted	are	states	of	affairs,	some	of	which	may	be	past.	However,	the	peculiar	way	in	which	the	past	bears	on	regret	is	not	specifically	due	to	the	object	of	regret	being	past,	rather	what	matters	is	how	that	past	state	of	affairs	is	evaluated	at	the	present	time	when	‘looking	back’.	We	can	get	a	sense	of	how	to	read	this	notion	(as	we	will	see,	the	perceptual	analogy	is	not	wholly	coincidental)	by	reflecting	on	one	of	his	paradigm	cases	in	‘Moral	Luck’	–	his	reimagining	of	the	life	of	the	painter	Gauguin.	Williams’	Gauguin	deserts	his	family	in	Paris	to	realise	his	painterly	ambitions	on	Tahiti.	It	might	be	supposed	appropriate	that	Gauguin	should	regret	his	action,	but,	for	Williams,	this	is	not	at	all	plain.	He	sorts	among	two	species	of	regret		that	are	relevant	to	a	consideration	of	Gauguin’s	affective	response	–	agent-regret	and	regret	in	general	–.	It	is	worth	quoting	in	full	the	paragraph	that	distinguishes	these	two:	The	constitutive	thought	of	regret	in	general	is	something	like	‘how	much	better	if	it	had	been	otherwise’	and	the	feeling	can	in	principle	apply	to	anything	of	which	one	can	form	some	conception	of	how	it	might	have	been	otherwise,	together	with	consciousness	of	how	things	would	then	have	been	better.	In	this	general	sense	of	regret,	what	are	regretted	
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are	states	of	affairs,	and	they	can	be	regretted	in	principle	by	anyone	who	knows	of	them.	But	there	is	a	particularly	important	species	of	regret,	which	I	shall	call	‘agent-regret’,	which	a	person	can	only	feel	towards	his	own	past	actions	(or,	at	most,	actions	in	which	he	regards	himself	as	a	participant).	In	this	case,	the	supposed	possible	difference	is	that	one	might	have	acted	otherwise,	and	the	focus	of	the	regret	is	on	that	possibility,	the	thought	being	formed	in	part	by	first-personal	conceptions	of	how	one	might	have	acted	otherwise.	‘Agent-regret’	is	not	distinguished	from	regret	in	general	solely	or	simply	in	virtue	of	its	subject-matter.	There	can	be	cases	of	regret	directed	towards	one’s	own	past	actions	which	are	not	cases	of	agent-regret,	because	the	past	action	is	regarded	purely	externally,	as	one	might	regard	anyone	else’s	action.	Agent-regret	requires	not	merely	a	first-personal	subject-matter,	nor	yet	merely	a	particular	kind	of	psychological	content,	but	also	a	particular	kind	of	expression.	(1976:	123)	Further,	 regret	necessarily	involves	a	wish	that	things	had	been	otherwise.	But	it	does	not	necessarily	involve	the	wish	that,	all	things	taken	together,	one	had	acted	otherwise.	So,	what	kind	of	regret	should	we	expect	Gauguin	to	feel?		Presuming	Gauguin	had	some	awareness	of	the	‘claims’	(117)	his	family	had	on	him	and	what	neglecting	them	amounted	to,	we	might	suppose	him	prone	to	bouts	of	general	regret.	Here	we	might	imagine	him	regarding	his	past	action	purely	externally,	and	even	wishing	that	things	had	been	otherwise	–	say,	that	his	desires	had	not	
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conflicted	so	irrevocably.	Still,	he	need	not	thereby	wish	that	he	had	acted	otherwise.	In	what	circumstances	would	he	wish	that	he	had	so	done?	Notoriously,	Williams	argues	that	Gauguin	will	wish	to	have	acted	otherwise	only	in	the	event	that	he	is	unsuccessful	in	his	ambitions	as	a	painter.	Of	course,	his	failure	as	a	painter	might	be	a	matter	of	bad	luck	–	for	example,	he	might	have	been	injured	on	the	way	to	Tahiti,	in	which	case	‘his	decision	…	was	for	nothing	…	there	is	nothing	in	the	outcome	to	set	against	the	other	people’s	loss’	(120).	But	although	this	kind	of	‘external	luck’	renders	(retroactively,	for	Williams)	his	decision	unjustified,	it	does	not	serve	to	‘unjustify’	him,	to	show	that	he	was	wrong.	Rather	‘what	would	prove	him	wrong	in	his	project	would	not	just	be	that	it	failed	but	that	he	failed.’	To	wit:	his	failure	as	a	painter	would	also	reveal	he	failed	at	the	time	of	deliberation,	namely	in	letting	the	dream	of	artistic	experimentation	in	Polynesia	override	the	weight	of	his	parental	obligations.	For	Williams,	such	a	recognition	should	induce	‘agent-regret’.		On	Williams’	understanding,	agent-regret	can	be	only	experienced	from	a	perspective	or	‘standpoint	of	assessment’	that	regrets	the	events	and	actions	–	in	this	case	Gauguin	deserting	his	family	–	that	shaped	the	very	possibility	of	occupying	that	standpoint.	For	only	by	leaving	his	family	in	Paris	could	Gauguin	actually	come	to	occupy	a	standpoint	from	which	an	assessment,	negative	in	this	case,	is	even	so	much	as	possible.	For	Williams	then,	the	way	in	which	the	past	comes	to	be	negatively	evaluated	as	regretful	is	through	a	concomitant	evaluation	of	the	present,	the	contours	of	which	have	been	constitutively	shaped	by	those	past	events.13	It	is	worth	comparing	the	dream.	In	dream,	there	is	no	such	experiential	orientation	in	time,	nor	is	there	any	constitutive	connection	between	the	dream	past	
                                                            13	See	Wallace	2014	for	a	deft	analysis	of	the	shortcomings	of	this	view.	
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and	dream	present	–	the	dream,	recall,	is	created	‘anew	in	each	instant’	(O’Shaughnessy	2002:	92),	‘in	experiential	mid-air’.	Further,	past	dreamt	events	are	only	unified	with	present	dreamt	conditions	through	the	continuity	of	content	that	unifies	the	dream	–	both	sectors	are	part	of	the	same	dream.	Gauguin’s	past	experience	in	Paris,	however,	is	not	related	to	his	present	experience	in	Polynesia	merely	because	they	are	part	of	the	same	life	–	his.	Rather,	Gaugin’s	present	experience	is	such	that	it	is	partly	shaped	by	things	that	he	did	as	well	by	things	that	happened	to	him	as	a	matter	of	luck.	This	invites	an	early	attempt	at	isolating	a	connection	between	regret,	time,	and,	inter	alia,	wakefulness.	If	the	objects	of	regret	are	past	states	of	affairs	or	past	errors	in	deliberation	(Jacobson),	or	if	regret	involves	any	kind	of	temporal	orientation,	including	‘looking	back’	from	one’s	current	standpoint	of	assessment	(Williams),	it	is	unsurprising	that	regret	necessitates	wakefulness	and	more	particularly,	as	we	shall	later	see,	self-conscious	wakefulness.	Why	so?	Dream	experience	precludes	such	temporal	orientation.	Still,	this	leaves	unexplained	the	link	between	regret	and	insomnia.	Granted,	the	‘bedtime’	window	may	precipitate	reflection	on	the	near	and	distant	past,	but	it	might	be	wondered:	why	should	the	mere	remembering	that	regret	sometimes	involves	preclude	sleep?	For	instance,	we	know	that	recalling	past	events	for	which	one	is	grateful,	and	that	so	induce	positive	affect,	can	bring	on	sleep	(Emmons	and	McCullough	2003).	But	this	being	so,	neither	the	relevant	object	of	regret	being	past,	nor	one’s	temporal	orientation,	pass	explanatory	muster	in	trying	to	elucidate	a	link	between	regret	and	insomnia.	I	try	a	different	tack.	
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3 Mental Activity and Wakefulness 
Although	wakefulness	allows	for	temporal	orientation,	the	mere	fact	of	the	object	of	regret	being	past,	and	of	constitutively	shaping	the	current	standpoint	of	evaluation,	does	not	yet	explain	why	regret	should	induce	insomnia	–	this	is	what	§2	sought	to	establish.	There	is,	however,	another	explanation.	Recall	O’Shaughnessy’s	insistence	that	properly	formed	wakeful	consciousness	necessitates	mental	willing	–	the	active	governance	of	one’s	own	mental	acts.	If	acute,	this	gestures	at	a	second	link.	Earlier	I	quoted	Zeelenberg	and	Pieters:	regret	‘both	stems	from	and	produces	higher	order	cognitive	processes’	(2007:	5).	But	that	regret	may	stem	from	cognitive	activity	is	largely	unsurprising;	at	least	certain	episodes	of	regretting	may	be	preceded	by	active	episodic	recall,	namely	to	provide	the	episode	with	an	object.	There	are,	however,	at	least	two	other	ways	in	which	regret	and	cognitive	activity	may	be	linked.	This	is	what	I	spell	out	in	this	section.	As	we	have	noted,	Jacobson	(2013)	pits	deliberative	error	as	the	proper	object	of	regret;	Bagnoli	(2000)	disagrees,	invoking	tragedy.	Agamemnon	sacrifices	Iphigenia	at	Aulis,	but	his	decision	is	not	mistaken;	it	is	grounded	in	what	he	takes	to	be	an	overriding	reason	–	to	please	the	gods.	So	is	Agamemnon	thereby	immune	to	regret?	Surely,	he	is	not.	Bagnoli	takes	her	cue	from	Williams	in	explicating	her	alternative	analysis.	In	‘Ethical	Consistency’,	Williams	considers	ways	in	which	conflicts	in	belief	and	desire	differ.	Where	two	beliefs	are	consistent	but	conflicting,	the	discovery	that	one	of	the	beliefs	is	not	true	leads	to	its	abandonment:	
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The	rejected	belief	cannot	substantially	survive	…	to	decide	that	a	belief	is	untrue	is	to	abandon,	i.e.	no	longer	to	have	that	belief.	(1973:	170)	Desires	are	different	in	this	respect.	When	two	desires	conflict	but	where	the	conflict	resides	not	merely	in	a	contingent	feature	of	the	world,	but	essentially	–	viz.	where	the	world	is	such	that	it	is	impossible	that	both	be	satisfied	–	the	satisfaction	of	one	desire	does	not	always	lead	to	an	abandonment	of	the	other	as	it	does	in	the	case	of	belief.	Rather,	a	rejected	desire	may	‘reappear’	in	another	‘guise’	–	in	particular,	‘the	opportunity	for	satisfying	that	desire	having	irrevocably	gone,	it	may	reappear	in	the	form	of	a	regret	for	what	was	missed’	(170).14	Bagnoli	is	impressed	by	this	insight.	Regret,	for	Williams,	is	residual	in	the	sense	that,	as	Bagnoli	puts	it,	it	‘stands	for	a	value’	(174)	–	through	the	experience	of	regret,	the	subject	values	an	opportunity	forgone	in	deliberation.	Regretting,	then,	is	a	mode	of	valuing.	Even	so,	she	maintains,	Williams	gets	the	moral	phenomenology	of	regretting	wrong.	Specifically,	he	goes	awry	in	seeing	the	peculiar	agency	that	agent-regret	involves	as	symptomatic	of	value	pluralism.	I	explain	what	is	meant	by	this	charge.	For	Williams,	moral	values	are	not	supreme.	When	acting	in	the	context	of	value	pluralism,	moral	values	may	sometimes	be	overridden,	precipitating	regret.	Consider	Gauguin.	In	asking	whether	he	was	right	to	desert	his	family,	there	is,	for	Williams,	more	than	one	‘right’	–	aesthetic	values	may	trump	moral	ones:	
                                                            14	Compare	the	case	of	conflicting	desires	that	may	be	contingently	satisfied:	someone	who	is	lazy	and	thirsty	may	desire	to	remain	seated	while	at	the	same	time	wanting	to	get	up	to	get	a	drink.	Were	a	drink	suddenly	placed	in	arm’s	reach,	the	conflict	would	dissipate.	
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Perhaps	fewer	of	us	than	is	pretended	care	about	the	existence	of	Gauguin’s	paintings,	but	we	are	supposed	to	care	…	the	fact	is	that	if	we	believe	in	any	other	values	at	all,	then	it	is	likely	that	at	some	point	we	shall	have	reason	to	be	glad	that	moral	values	…	have	been	treated	as	one	value	among	others,	and	not	as	unquestionably	supreme.	(133)	Bagnoli	insists	that	for	Williams	‘regret	…	is	elected	as	a	significant	element	of	the	world	of	values,	rather	than	as	an	attitude	intelligible	in	the	perspective	of	the	agent’	(175).	Whether	or	not	we	agree	with	the	first	clause	of	her	criticism,	her	appeal	to	the	first-person	perspective	should	surely	resonate.	Regret	is	an	attitude	that	should	be	intelligible	from	that	perspective.	In	particular,	we	might	wonder	whether	there	is	a	phenomenological	dimension	to	emphasising	that	demand	for	intelligibility.	As	it	happens,	Williams	does	grant	that	differences	in	regret	in	general	and	agent-regret	shore	up	as	‘differences	in	the	thoughts	and	images	that	enter	the	sentiment’	(124)	–	a	certain	recognition	of	the	phenomenological	dimensions	of	the	first-person	perspective	are	not	then	absent	in	his	account.	Still,	Williams	does	not	tell	us	how	we	should	understand	this	experiential	difference	between	regret	and	agent-regret.	Bagnoli’s	work	is	instructive	in	this	respect.	Bagnoli	submits	that	regret	is	an	emotion15	that	involves	counterfactual	patterns	of	thinking	and	imagining.	But	what	kinds	of	differences	in	the	counterfactual	thoughts	and	imaginings	should	we	suppose	regret	in	general	and	agent-regret	supporting?	Her	thought	is	the	following.16	Suppose	a	chorus	were	to	fictively	represent	the	alternatives	that	would	have	been	available	to	Agamemnon	at	Aulis	–	perhaps	by	performing	those	alternatives.	The	representation	is	descriptive	and	the	full	range	of	
                                                            15	As	will,	of	course,	be	clear	by	now,	I	too	assume	that	regret	is	an	emotion.	16	I	have	adapted	her	example	for	purposes	of	exposition.	
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alternatives	available	is	determined,	as	Williams	would	have	it,	by	the	way	the	world	is.	In	contrast,	the	range	of	alternatives	that	Agamemnon	would	have	considered	–	presumably	in	thoughts	and	images	–	is	evaluative	and	is	determined	by	what	for	the	agent	were	viable	alternatives	at	the	time	of	deliberation.	Bagnoli’s	idea,	drawing	on	Williams,	is	that,	in	regret,	such	thoughts	and	images	may	reappear.	What	they	represent	in	such	instances,	however,	is	not	opportunities	missed	due	to	how	the	world	is	or	was,	pace	Williams,	but	rather	what	for	the	agent	were	potentially	viable	and	valuable	alternatives	not	taken	up.	This	phenomenal	‘reappearance’	of	reasons	makes	plain	the	practical	significance	of	regret.17	Regret	‘reminds’	the	subject	of	reasons	that	were	supported	but	were	not	overriding.	It	hence	‘reminds’	the	subject	that	‘some	more	work	has	to	be	done’	(185)	–	for	example,	reparation	needs	to	be	made,	an	excuse	offered,	or	forgiveness	asked	for,	say.	But	to	this	extent,	as	Bagnoli	explains,	‘regret	may	have	a	motivational	force	insofar	as	it	provides	the	agent	with	a	practical	reason:	it	calls	attention	to	a	reason	for	action.	In	calling	attention	to	a	reason	for	action	regret	can	initiate	a	new	deliberation’	(185).18	This	indicates	a	wholly	different	way	in	which	mental	activity	and	regret	can	be	linked	–	regret	can	precipitate	new	chains	of	thinking.	But	if	so,	as	I	think	seems	phenomenologically	plausible,	and	if,	too,	O’Shaughnessy	is	correct	in	postulating	a	constitutive	link	between	wakefulness	and	mental	activity,	it	is	hardly	any	wonder	that	regret	induces	sleeplessness.	Why?	For	it	induces	thinking	and	thinking	necessitates	
                                                            17	To	make	sense	of	how	reasons	can	‘phenomenally’	reappear,	see	Soteriou	(2013).	18	For	some	sleepers,	the	relevant	chains	of	deliberation	are	neither	productive	nor	yield	closure	–	such	subjects	perceive	their	minds	to	be	‘racing’	(Schmidt,	Harvey,	and	Van	der	Linden	2011),	they	ruminate.	Roese	et	al.	(2009)	identify	a	species	of	regret	that	they	call	‘repetitive	regret’	which	involves	rumination.	
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wakefulness.	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	regret	is	special	in	this	respect.	If	we	are	awake,	we	are	bound	to	think	–	says	O’Shaughnessy	‘the	[wakeful]	conscious	find	themselves	in	the	grip	of	a	necessity	to	freely	choose	their	own	occupations	of	thought	and	attention’	(2002:	89).	But,	if	so,	the	mere	fact	that	regret	may	precipitate	thinking	does	not	yet	explain	why	regret	may	induce	insomnia.	We	can,	however,	find	the	resources	in	Bagnoli’s	account	to	excavate	a	third	link,	one	which,	as	I	explain	in	later	sections,	brings	us	closer	to	an	explanation.	Though	Bagnoli	may	have	reason	not	to	explicitly	invoke	Nico	Frijda’s	conception	of	the	‘action	tendency’,	it	seems	natural	to	wonder	whether	the	peculiar	action	tendency	of	regret	might	not	simply	be	to	so	think	and	imagine.	Jacobson’s	sentimentalist	treatment	of	regret	invites	such	speculation.	Sentiments,	for	Jacobson,	form	a	class	of	emotion	types,	the	nature	of	which	is	open	to	empirical	discovery.	Like	other	emotions,	sentiments	are,	for	Jacobsen,	best	conceived	as	‘syndromes’	of	thought,	feeling,	and	motivation	–	something	that	tallies	with	the	O’Shaughnessy-inspired	approach	explored	in	this	chapter	(see	also	Soteriou,	Chapter	4,	this	volume).	Unlike	other	emotions,	however,	the	sentiments	are	apt	to	display	two	further	features.	First,	they	exhibit	stable	recalcitrance	–	they	tend	not	to	be	responsive	to	belief.	Second,	and	critically,	they	issue	in	acting	without	thinking.	In	the	case	of	regret,	however,	this	sparks	a	further	puzzle.	For	consider:	if	the	peculiar	action	tendency	of	regret	is	just	to	counterfactually	think	and	imagine,	and	if	action	tendencies	are	typically	discharged	without	thinking,	can	we	really	make	sense	of	those	mental	actions	as	action	tendencies	that	can,	as	it	were,	be	performed	without	thinking?	Further,	we	might	wonder:	how	do	such	putative	‘mental	action	tendencies’	compare	with	those	of	other	sentiments?	Someone	in	the	grip	of	rage	may	‘lash	out’,	stamp	their	feet,	slam	doors.	Those	who	are	
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fearful	may	tremble	and	flee.	But	in	what	sense	could	regret	involve	acting	without	thinking	in	any	analogous	sense,	if	at	all?	Jacobson	does	not	address	this	issue,	suggesting	only	that	regret	prompts	a	‘policy	change’	for	future	action;	it	has	practical	significance	insofar	as	it	involves	a	motivation	to	act	differently	next	time.	It	might	be	queried,	however,	just	how	acute	this	generalisation	is.	The	notion	of	‘policy	change’	may	have	little	traction	in	cases	where	the	acts	or	outcomes	regretted	are	highly	idiosyncratic.	Worse,	it	seems	that	regret	is	sometimes	compatible	with	a	complete	failure	of	policy	change,	as	in	cases	of	akrasia.	But	if	such	motivation	towards	policy	change	is	the	peculiar	‘action	tendency	of	regret’,	and	if	sentiments	are	partly	distinguished	from	emotions	in	having	specific	and	even	empirically	discoverable	action	tendencies,	are	such	episodes	less	‘sentimental’	or	less	canonically	episodes	of	‘regret’	for	all	that?	If	anything,	surely	the	regret	that	is	experienced	thereafter	is	even	more	bitterly	felt?19	In	the	next	section,	I	try	to	bring	these	twin	observations	into	synchrony:	the	supposition	that	the	peculiar	action	tendency	of	regret	is	to	counterfactually	think	and	imagine	as	well	as	the	thought	that	regret	can	sometimes	issue	in	‘thoughtless’	thinking	and	imagining	and	so	have	a	characteristic	action	tendency	even	in	cases	of	inaction	or	where	regret	does	not	or	cannot	motivate	‘policy	change’.	Here	my	argument	harnesses	aspects	of	Williams’	account	that	remain	unexplored	in	the	literature	but	which	I	consider	deserve	further	consideration	–	specifically	his	insight	that	agent-regret	has	a	peculiar	mode	of	expression,	and	that	it	involves	a	wish.	I	will	claim	that	sometimes	regret	can	issue	in	mental	expressive	actions	that	can	be	understood	as	expressive	of	a	wish.	And	this	in	turn	will	allow	me	to	reassert	the	significance	of	Williams’	connection	
                                                            19	As	Zeelenberg	and	Pieters	(2007)	report,	‘inactions’	–	failures	to	act	–	are	apt	to	generate	even	more	regret	than	actions.	
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between	regret	and	one’s	present	occupation	of	a	‘standpoint	of	assessment’,	one’s	self-conscious	occupation	of	which,	as	I	will	argue,	can	sometimes	preclude	sleep.	
4 Wishing, Reparation, and Inaction 
Goldie	(2000)	distinguishes	among	expressions	of	emotion	that	are	actions	and	those	that	are	not	–	for	instance,	autonomic	nervous	responses	like	sweating	and	muscular	reactions	like	flinching.	These	latter	expressions	are	not	something	one	does.	Expressions	of	emotion	that	are	actions,	however,	are	distinguished	from	actions	that	are	not	expressions	of	emotion,	and	this	is	so	even	if	emotion	can	sometimes	precipitate	actions	that	have	all	the	hallmarks	of	being	an	emotional	expressive	action	but	that	are	not.	For	example,	say	in	the	presence	of	a	bull,	I	decide	to	flee.	Though	I	may	feel	fear	in	the	presence	of	the	bull,	I	flee	in	order	to	escape	the	bull’s	presence.	Let	us	say	that	my	fleeing	is	a	reasoned	action	out	of	emotion.	Though	I	feel	fear,	I	was	cognitively	and	conatively,	and	not	affectively,	moved	to	act.	Compare	the	following	case.	I	flee	in	fear.	In	this	case,	say,	the	action	is	not	adequately	explained	by	a	belief/desire	pair.20	I	do	not	any	more	flee	with	the	aim	of	removing	myself	from	the	bull’s	presence.	I	am	moved	by	feeling.	Actions	that	are	performed	in	emotion	are	genuine	expressions	of	emotion,	says	Goldie.	And	they	are	genuine	since	they	are	not	done	as	a	means	to	some	further	end.	Compare	a	caress	that	is	intended	to	demonstrate	love,	to	one	that	unfolds	spontaneously	in	an	act	of	love.	We	can	apply	this	distinction	to	our	earlier	discussion.	Although	regret	may	sometimes	precipitate	actions	that	are	reasoned	actions	performed	out	of	emotion	–	
                                                            20	It	might	be	queried	whether	the	‘standard’	story	of	action	causation	that	appeals	to	belief/desire	pairs	is	apt	even	to	non-expressive	action	(see	Hornsby	2010)	–	I	assume	it	is,	but	only	for	expository	purposes.	
  24 
new	episodes	of	deliberation	which	may	themselves	involve	counterfactual	patterns	of	thinking	or	imagining,	or	even,	as	Williams	insists,	concrete	acts	of	reparation	–	it	may	also,	or	so	I	am	suggesting,	involve	actions	that	are	performed	in	emotion,	specifically	the	mental	actions	of	counterfactually	thinking	and	imagining.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Bagnoli’s	position	seems	to	hybridise	both	these	forms	of	action	–	actions	performed	both	in	and	out	of	the	experience	of	regret.	For	consider:	reasons	‘reappear’	and	call	for	attention	and	they	have	a	motivating	force,	namely	to	initiate	new	deliberations.	But	those	reappearing	reasons	and	imaginings	are	not	projects	undertaken	by	the	subject	to	achieve	some	end.	Rather,	in	regret,	as	I	am	claiming,	the	subject	just	tends	to	counterfactually	think	and	imagine.	Let	us	say,	then,	that	in	regret	the	subject	may	sometimes	engage	in	mental	expressive	actions	that	are	not	merely	produced	by	regret	–	that	are	not	merely	outputs	of	the	state	regret	–	but	are,	in	part,	the	regretting.	This	claim	requires	further	clarification	and	indeed	justification	–	a	task	for	elsewhere.	For	now,	I	raise	two	considerations	that	are	pertinent	to	a	more	careful	delineation	of	the	notion	of	a	mental	expressive	action.	First,	it	might	be	supposed	that	if	regret	does	involve	mental	expressive	action,	then	there	ought	to	be	some	way	of	showing	that	the	kinds	of	mental	expressive	actions	that	regret	involves	are	continuous	in	kind	with	those	expressive	actions	that	have	so	far	been	considered	in	the	literature	–	so-called	arational	actions;	those	of	the	grieving	for	example,	when	they	embrace	the	garments	of	a	loved	one	who	has	died	(Hursthouse	1991).	Second,	if	this	kind	of	analysis	is	vaguely	on	the	right	track	and	if	regret	is	indeed	a	sentiment	that	sometimes	issues	in	mentally	acting	without	thinking,	then	it	seems	there	needs	to	be	some	way	of	explaining	why	regret,	like	other	sentiments,	can	nonetheless	be	stably	recalcitrant.	For	prima	facie,	if	regret	involves	
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counterfactual	patterns	of	imagining	and	thinking,	then	regret,	surely,	ought	not	to	be	impervious	to	belief.	I	suggest	that	two	features	of	Williams’	original	account	should	be	recovered	so	as	to	make	conceptual	space	for,	and	accommodate,	these	considerations:	first,	Williams’	insight	that	agent-regret	has	a	particular	mode	of	expression	and,	second,	his	emphasis	not	on	reasons	(like	Bagnoli),	but	wishes.21	Williams,	in	recruiting	the	concept	of	‘expression’	seems	to	have	had	concrete	expressive	acts	of	reparation	in	mind.	I	will	instead	emphasise	expressive	mental	actions.	Further,	while	Williams	insists	that	regret	may	involve	a	wish	that	things	had	been	otherwise,	I	shall	contend	that	regret	may	involve	the	wish	that	things	be	different	now.	In	this,	I	take	my	inspiration	from	Goldie.	For	Goldie,	wishes	that	are	not	idle	desires	(like	the	desire	to	be	taller,	say)	involve	not	just	desiring	the	thing	or	state	of	affairs	wished	for,	but	imagining	or	being	disposed	to	imagine	that	the	desire	is	satisfied	(2000:	28).	And	this	helps	him	spell	out	in	what	sense	wishes	are	operative	in	expressive	actions.	Such	actions	are,	says	Goldie,	the	imaginative	expression	of	a	wish.	When	a	grieving	subject	caresses	the	clothes	of	the	loved	one	who	has	died,	the	clothes	are	imaginatively	invested	with	symbolic	significance	–	the	subject	imagines	that	she	is	really	caressing	the	person	who	has	died	and	her	imaginative	act	is	expressive	of	the	wish	that	she	really	be	caressing	that	person.	Though	she	is	aware	of	what	she	is	doing	–	she	does	not	believe	that	by	caressing	their	garments	she	caresses	them	–	she	nonetheless	imagines	her	wish	to	be	satisfied.	Accordingly,	she	wishes	that	things	were	different	now.	As	Goldie	explains,	‘the	symbolic	nature	of	the	expression	takes	place	as	it	does	partly	because	the	literal	
                                                            21	Note	this	is	a	difference	of	emphasis:	one	may	after	all	claim	that	reasons	play	the	role	Bagnoli	thinks	they	play	only	conditional	on	the	presence	of	a	wish.	Thanks	to	Fabrice	Teroni	for	emphasising	this	point.	
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action,	as	it	were,	is	not	a	realistic	option’	(29).	Compare	Williams	on	agent-regret:	the	agent	will	act	in	some	way	‘which	he	hopes	will	constitute	or	at	least	symbolise	some	kind	of	recompense	or	restitution	and	this	will	be	an	expression	of	his	agent-regret	(1973:	124;	my	emphasis).	Though	Goldie	considers	expressive	actions	that	involve	imaginative	relations	to	external	objects	–	a	cushion,	for	example,	may	be	co-opted	for	the	person	one	wants	to	pummel	–	it	is	not,	I	think,	difficult	to	appreciate	in	what	sense	regret	might	involve	wishes	of	a	similar	kind,	and	perhaps	especially	so	in	cases	where	the	regretted	situation	is	beyond	mending	or	where,	as	Goldie	puts	it,	‘literal	action	…	is	not	a	realistic	option’.	In	this	case	the	suggestion	is	that	one	may	counterfactually	imagine	not	only	how	things	might	have	been,	but	how	things	could	have	been	now,	where	such	imagining	is	expressive	of	the	wish	that	things	really	be	that	way.22	My	only	defence	of	this	claim	is	that	it	strikes	me	as	phenomenologically	plausible.23	But	there	are	explanatory	advantages	to	the	approach	too.	For	example,	while	we	can	allow	that	valued	reasons	can	sometimes	‘reappear’	in	the	guise	of	regret,	we	need	not	insist	that	this	is	all	there	is	to	the	phenomenology	of	regretting.	Since	wishes	need	not	track	considered	reasons	or	desires	that	‘reappear’,	wholly	hitherto	unconsidered	alternatives	or	visions	of	how	things	now	could	be	may,	for	the	first	time,	‘appear’.	Again,	this	strikes	me	as	phenomenologically	resonant.	Further,	since	such	expressive	actions	unfold	in	regret,	they	are	not	best	thought	of	as	projects	that	the	
                                                            22	On	this	understanding,	one	may	even	find	oneself	surprised	by	one’s	wishes	–	that	is,	one	may	be	surprised	to	find	oneself	imagining	as	one	does.	To	this	extent,	actions	that	are	expressive	of	a	wish	need	not	always	be	intelligible	from	the	perspective	of	the	agent,	pace	Bagnoli.	Instead,	regret	may	provide	an	opportunity	for	insight,	not	just	a	reminder	‘that	more	work	has	to	be	done’.	23	See	Gordon	1992	for	descriptive	phenomenological	reports	of	experienced	regret	based	on	dialogical	interviews.	
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subject	undertakes,	which	in	turn	preserves	Jacobson’s	insight	regarding	the	sentimentality	of	regret:	since	wishes	are	not	always	answerable	to	beliefs,	such	regret	can	be	recalcitrant.	In	sum,	this	now	suggests	three	distinct	ways	in	which	mental	activity	may	be	involved	in	occurrent	regretting:	through	active	episodic	recall,		through	precipitating	new	chains	of	deliberation,	or	through	the	mental	expressive	actions	of	counterfactually	imagining	and	thinking.	But	even	if	this	much	is	granted	–	and	naturally		there	is	a	great	deal	more	to	say		–	our	original	puzzle	still	stands.	If	regret	and	wakefulness	are	linked	through	mental	action	–	be	it	reasoned	action	out	of	emotion	or,	as	I	am	suggesting	here,	mental	activity	that	is	expressive	of	regret	–	why	is	it	the	case	that	regret	is	sometimes	not	merely	incompatible	with	sleep,	but	may	preclude	falling	asleep?	To	get	a	sense	of	why	we	are	left	with	a	residual	puzzle,	it	is	instructive	to	consider	a	case	that	Bagnoli	frames	in	furthering	her	claim	that	the	object	of	regret	is	a	valued	alternative	supported	by	good	but	not	overriding	reasons.	She	introduces	us	to	Jackie.	Jackie	chose	between	two	different	life	paths	–	to	pursue	architecture	or	modern	dance.	She	chose	the	first	and	considers	this	decision	the	right	one.	Nonetheless,	she	regrets	not	being	a	dancer.	As	Bagnoli	admits,	Jackie’s	regret	might	seem	odd.	On	many	accounts,	it	might	even	come	out	as	inappropriate	or	irrational.	Bagnoli’s	account	however,	as	well	as	mine,	can	divert	this	charge	–	through	regret,	Jackie	may	value	that	alternative,	perhaps	sometimes	imagining	her	wish	to	be	satisfied.	Still,	if	Jackie’s	regret	keeps	her	awake	at	night,	then	it	seems	to	me	that	we	might	be	inclined	to	suspect	that	something	is,	after	all,	amiss	with	Jackie’s	regretting.	Specifically,	it	seems	we	might	be	disinclined	to	believe	her	when	she	says	that	she	considers	that	she	made	the	right	
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decision	in	choosing	to	become	an	architect.	So,	what	then	is	specific	to	those	forms	of	nocturnal	regret	which	are	such	that	insomnia	may	result?	
5 Self-Conscious Regret 
In	the	course	of	this	chapter,	I	have	appealed	to	different	properties	of	the	wakeful	state,	and	so	properties	of	the	subject	in	that	state	so	as	to	motivate	a	link	between	regret	and	wakefulness.	Since	wakefulness	enables	in	its	subject	the	power	to	experience	the	passage	of	time	and	to	relate,	through	episodic	memory,	to	particular	past	times,	and	since	regret	constitutively	involves	mental	activity	of	various	sorts,	including,	as	I	have	suggested,	mental	action	that	is	expressive	of	a	wish,	it	should	be	plain	that	regret	is	an	affective	state	of	the	wakeful.	In	closing,	I	suggest	that	these	twin	features	can	be	united	through	a	further	dimension	of	the	wakeful	state,	one	that	finally	allows	us	to	resolve	the	difficulty	of	seeing	how	it	is	that	occurrent	regret	may	sometimes	preclude	falling	asleep.	I	have	suggested	that	sometimes	the	regretful	subject	may	imagine	that	her	wish	that	things	be	otherwise	is	satisfied	now.	Earlier,	I	set	out	O’Shaughnessy	thought	that	only	the	wakeful	subject	can	apply	the	indexical	‘now’.	So,	what	capacities	are	involved	in	a	subject’s	imagining	that	her	wish	is	satisfied	now?	As	we	have	noted,	only	a	self-conscious,	wakeful	subject	can	encounter	the	world	under	the	aspect	‘truth’	–	that	is,	only	a	self-conscious,	wakeful	subject	can	compare	the	thought	‘p’	with	the	reality	that	makes	p	true,	where	‘this	in	turn	requires	the	knowledge	that	one	has	that	thought,	together	with	the	capacity	to	contemplate	its	denial	as	a	possibility	that	is	here	in	fact	not	realised’	(O’	Shaughnessy	2002:	111).	But	regret,	surely,	involves	a	like	capacity.	The	regretful	subject,	even	while	imagining	that	
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her	wish	is	satisfied	now,	is	aware	that	she	is	imagining	–	she	is	self-aware	of	the	proper	mode	of	her	cogitations.	But,	as	such,	she	is	aware	too	that	what	she	is	now	imagining	is	not	now	realised.	This	is	why	her	imagining	is	an	expression	of	her	regret.	Return	to	Jackie.	Suppose	that	Jackie’s	regret	keeps	her	awake.	Why	might	we	be	inclined	to	suppose	that	there	is	something	awry	with	Jackie’s	regretting?	Jackie	claims	that	she	is	happy	with	her	life	as	an	architect	and	what	she,	on	one	understanding,	thereby	is:	an	architect.	But	surely	her	nocturnal	regret	speaks	against	this.	Anthony	Kenny	expresses	a	similar	doubt:	If	a	man	says	that	he	is	afraid	of	winning	£10,000	in	the	pools,	we	want	to	ask	him	more:	does	he	believe	that	money	corrupts,	or	does	he	expect	to	lose	his	friends,	or	to	be	annoyed	by	begging	letters,	or	what?	If	we	can	elicit	from	him	only	descriptions	of	the	good	aspects	of	the	situation	then	we	cannot	understand	why	he	reports	his	emotion	as	fear	and	not	as	hope.	(1963:	134)	My	claim	is	not	that	the	case	of	Jackie	is	incoherent,	but	only	that	if	her	regret	induces	insomnia,	we	might	have	reason	to	query	the	extent	to	which	Jackie	knows	her	own	mind.	Perhaps	she	would	prefer	to	dance	after	all.	But	if	so,	then	it	is	plausible	that	the	object	of	Jackie’s	regret	is	(some	variation	on)	the	standpoint	of	assessment	that	she	now	occupies,	perhaps	the	life	she	now	leads,	or	maybe	the	person	who	leads	that	life:	herself.	So	why	should	such	regretting,	which	has	such	objects,	preclude	sleep?	In	reflecting	earlier	on	the	‘holism’	that	characterises	states	of	consciousness	and	their	properties,	we	noted	that	in	removing	the	state	of	wakeful	consciousness,	say,	by	the	use	of	anaesthesia,	one	removes	the	properties.	In	contrast,	modifying	the	properties	involves	modifying	the	state.	Applying	this	to	the	state	of	regret,	itself	a	
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modification	of	wakeful	consciousness,	we	might	therefore	expect	two	distinct	therapeutic	approaches	to	resolving	regret-induced	insomnia:	those	aimed	at	modifying	the	properties	that	constitute	the	state	of	regret	(and	that	thereby	modify	the	state),	and	those	aimed	at	removing	the	state	of	regret	directly.	There	is	at	least	some	evidence	for	such	a	twofold	approach.	Davis	and	colleagues	(1995)	contend	that	those	who	experience	regret	either	tend	to	overestimate	the	extent	to	which	the	alternatively	imagined	scenarios	were	possible,	or	the	degree	to	which	they	had	genuine	control	over	the	outcome	of	a	given	situation.24	Resolving	such	regret	involves	downplaying	the	sense	in	which	the	relevant	alternative	was	genuinely	possible.	But	if	what	I	have	suggested	is	right,	such	an	intervention	may	not	resolve	regret	that	is	expressive	of	a	wish.	For	such	regrets	may	be	more	recalcitrant	to	reason.	A	distinct	approach	aims	at	rationalising	a	discrepancy	between	one’s	values	and	actions,	where	the	experience	of	regret	may	be	regarded	as	expressive	of	one’s	evaluative	perspective	(see	also	Betzler	2004).	But	to	this	extent,	the	experience	of	regret	may	in	fact	reassure	–	despite	what	one	has	done,	one’s	values	are	intact	and	hence,	to	a	certain	extent,	oneself.	Thus	reassured	the	subject	can	seek	to	rationalise,	if	not	justify	or	excuse,	regretful	action	on	other	grounds.	For	other	subjects,	however,	it	is	clear	that	the	experience	of	regret	seems	not	to	reassure	at	all	–	it	may	not	‘remind’	the	subject	of	who	they	are	precisely	because	who-they-are	is	the	object	of	their	regret.	As	Fisher	and	Exline	explain:	Regret	can	involve	a	sense	of	damage	or	loss	focused	on	a	person’s	core	identity,	as	suggested	by	such	statements	as,	‘I	used	to	be	a	
                                                            24	On	Williams’	approach,	this	would	not	preclude	regret,	but	might	allow	for	a	transmutation	of	agent-regret	into	regret	in	general.	
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conscientious	person	before	I	did	this	act’	or	‘I	could	have	been	a	brilliant	musician	if	I	would	have	made	better	choices.’	(2010:	556)	Such	may	be	Jackie’s	difficulty.	But	if	this	is	so,	then	to	resolve	such	regret	it	seems	that	one	must	remove,	not	the	properties	or	powers	that	constitute	the	state	–	for	instance,	it	is	not	merely	enough	to	stem	the	flow	of	counterfactual	thinking	and	imagining	–	but	the	state	itself.	Since,	however,	the	object	of	regret	–	the	subject	–	is	in	the	state,	to	remove	the	state,	one	must	deprive	the	state	of	its	object.	But	how?	Therapeutic	approaches	that	focus	on	acceptance	and	self-forgiveness	seem	to	focus	on	resolving	regret	along	these	lines,	so	that	one’s	self,	or,	simply,	the	person	one	takes	oneself	to	be,	is	no	longer	an	object	of	regret.	This	finally	suggests	a	way	in	which	regret	may	not	merely	be	incompatible	with	sleep,	but	may	preclude	falling	asleep.	If	the	object	of	one’s	regret	is	oneself	or,	more	minimally,	one’s	standpoint	of	assessment,	it	is	not	just	the	case	that	one	is	awake	because	one	is	regretting,	but	rather	to	regret	what	one	regrets	–	oneself	and	perhaps	even	(aspects	of)	one’s	existence	–	one	cannot	fall	asleep.	For	what	one	regrets	can	only	be	wakefully	‘given’	to	one:	oneself.	
Conclusion 
I	have	appealed	to	different	properties	of	the	wakeful	state	so	as	to	motivate	a	link	between	regret	and	wakefulness.	If	correct,	regret	is	essentially	an	affective	state	of	the	wakeful.	In	particular,	I	have	tried	to	motivate	a	position	on	which	the	cognitive	activity	that	attends	regret	may	sometimes	occur	in	emotion	and	be	expressive	of	a	wish	–	a	‘strangely	enchanted’	expressive	mental	action.	Finally,	I	have	attempted	to	forge	a	link	between	regret	and	insomnia,	not	just	by	appeal	to	temporal	orientation	or	cognitive	
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activity,	which,	if	O’Shaughnessy	is	correct	necessitate	wakefulness,	but	to	the	self-conscious	subject,	something	that	is	lost	in	sleep	and	dream.	
